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(iv)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The question presented for review on the appeal of the
plaintiffs is whether the lower court was correct in granting
summary judgment to the defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation
(hereinafter "NAC") on the plaintiff's claim against NAC for
punitive damages for the actions of NAC's non-supervisory
employee, the co-defendant Donald Rogers (hereinafter
"Rogers"), under the facts of this case as found by the lower
court for the purposes of NAC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on punitive damages.

This question involves the

determination of two issues:
1.

Under what circumstances, if any, can an employer

be held liable in punitive damages in Utah for the tortious
conduct of an employee?
2.

What are the standards in Utah for the imposition

of punitive damages?
The questions presented for review on the appeal of
the defendants are:
1.

Does Utah recognize a cause of action for

emotional distress to one "within the zone of danger" who
witnesses injury to another?
2*.

If Utah does recognize such a cause of action,

are the claims of Ray C. Johnson barred by Utah Code Annotated
§ 31-41-9?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a motor vehicle-pedestrian
accident*

The plaintiffs* Amended Complaint seeks, as against

the individual defendant Donald Rogers and his employer NAC,
jointly and severally, compensatory damages for the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's minor decedent; compensatory damages
for the plaintiff Raymond Johnson for physical injuries and
emotional distress; compensatory damages for the plaintiff
Frances Johnson for physical injuries and emotional distress;
and "punitive damages against defendant Rogers in the amount o
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000), . . . punitive damages
against defendant NAC in the amount of One Million Dollars
($1,000,000), imputed to it by virtue of the actions of
defendant Rogers, and . . . punitive damages against defendant
NAC in the amount of Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000), for it
own separate and independent action,"

Discovery has included

written interrogatories, the exchange of documents and the
taking of oral depositions of witnesses.
On December 10, 1984, NAC moved the trial court for
partial summary judgment on punitive damages.
argued before the court on February 8, 1985.

The matter was
On March 22,

1985, NAC filed a motion with the court seeking dismissal or
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partial summary judgment with regard to the claims of the
plaintiffs for recovery for emotional distress.
On March 25, 1985, the trial court issued its
Memorandum Decision granting NAC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on punitive damages.

On March 26, 1985, the defendant

Rogers moved the court for partial summary judgment on the
issue of punitive damages.

On March 28, 1985, the defendant

Rogers moved this court for partial summary judgment with
regard to the plaintiffs' claims for recovery for emotional
distress.

On April 2, 1985, the court heard argument on

plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of NAC's motion for
partial summary judgment on punitive damages and on motions
respecting negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
granted the defendants' motions to dismiss those claims with
regard to the plaintiff Frances C. Johnson but denied the
defendants' motions to dismiss those claims with regard to Ray
C. Johnson.

On April 5, 1985, the court entered its Partial

Summary Judgment on the issue of punitive damages as to the
defendants Rogers and Newspaper Agency Corporation; and on
April 25, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a petition before this
court for permission to appeal that Partial Summary Judgment.
The defendants filed a petition to appeal the trial court's
rulings with regard to the emotional distress claims.
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On July 22, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a motion with
this court for summary reversal, and on August 5, 1985, the
defendants filed a motion for summary reversal regarding Ray C.
Johnson's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
On August 27, 1985, this court denied both petitions
for summary disposition.
An additional party in the case below was the Between
Friends Club, a private club against whom relief was sought
under the Utah dram shop act.

Between friends settled with all

parties for payment to the plaintiffs of fifty thousand
dollars.

Subsequently, NAC filed an offer of judgment for one

hundred twenty-five thousand dollars.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Donald Rogers was employed by the
Newspaper Agency Corporation in May of 1980 (Deposition of
Terry Northrup, May 5, 1983, page 11). At the time he was
hired, he was recommended as an excellent employee by his
former employer McQuaid Towing (Northrup, page 12). At that
time, Rogers' driver's license record indicated that he had a
Utah chauffeur's license in good standing, with one ticket
(Id.).

Rogers was hired by Terry Northrup, who was to be his

immediate supervisor.

At the time he was hired, there was no
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indication on his driving record that he had ever been arrested
for driving under the influence of alcohol/ and Mr. Northrup
was not aware that Rogers had a record of such an arrest some
years previously in the state of Oregon (Northrup, page 13)•
Prior to April of 1982, Rogers was a good employee whose record
indicated no adverse personnel actions, or warnings.
At the time that Donald Rogers was hired by NAC, NAC
had adopted written "NAC Rules of Conduct and Office Rules"
which were presented to all NAC employees at the time they were
hired for their review and signature (Northrup, p. 24-25).

A

copy of the "NAC Rules of Conduct and Office Rules", from
Rogers' personnel file, is attached to the deposition of Terry
Northrup as Exhibit "2", and attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
The document lists 12 rules "violation of any of which is just
cause for discipline or discharge."
are underlined.

Four of the twelve rules

Rule number four, one of the underlined rules,

reads as follows:

"4. Being under the influence of, or

possessing or using alcohol or illegal drugs during work
time."

At the bottom of the document is the following

handwritten sentence: "I have read and fully understand the
above violations with emphasis on those areas underlined."
Underneath this handwritten sentence is the date "1-7-81" and
the signature of the defendant Donald Rogers.
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Donald Rogers had not been originally hired as a
driver, but rather as a dock worker on the newspaper loading
dock (Northrup, p. 35; Rogers, 1982, p. 20). He would
occasionally fill in as a driver, and in January of 1982, began
filling in as a driver on the Park City run (Northrup, page
37).

Prior to this period of time Rogers worked on the day

shift, and was not working on the dock or driving at night
(Second Deposition of Donald Rogers, October 3, 1984, at page
21, 22).
For approximately 6 months to a year prior to the
accident that is the subject of this action, Donald Rogers fell
into a pattern of daily drinking (Rogers, 1984, page 12).
Rogers' drinking was done almost exclusively after work, and
primarily by himself (Rogers, 1984, page 13, 14, 15, 16, 17).
On April 16, 1982, the defendant Donald Rogers, while
driving the NAC pickup truck which he used for the Park City
run, was involved in a vehicle/pedestrian accident which
resulted in the death of the plaintiff's son.

At the time of

the accident, Ray C. Johnson, David's father, was in the
general area where the accident occurred.
David's mother, was not.

Frances C. Johnson,

Although Ray C. Johnson did not

actually see the truck collide with his son, he did find his
son under the wheels of the truck.

Mr. Johnson received some
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minor injury himself either as a result of being hit by the
truck/ or being hit by a cement pillar at the time of the
accident.
Rogers was arrested of driving under the influence of
alcohol.

He pled guilty and was sentenced to prison.
There is no evidence that Terry Northrup, or other

supervisory or managerial employees or officers of NAC/ knew
that the defendant Rogers had a drinking problem in April of
1982/ or was other than the exemplary employee he had been
since he came to work for NAC.

There is deposition testimony

to the effect that some employees and ex-employees of NAC had
seen Rogers drinking.

It is significant to note that most of

such testimony is contained in depositions of ex-NAC employees
who had not been on the night shift when Rogers was a driver,
and would not be in a position to testify as to Rogers'
activities.

Most of the testimony cited by Appellants' brief

with regard to the subject of Rogers' drinking is by former NAC
employees who had been fired by NAC prior to the time that
Rogers was transferred to the night shift.

Michael Mann, whose

deposition testimony is cited frequently by the
plaintiff-appellants brief on the subject of Donald Rogers'
drinking/ was employed by NAC from January/ 1980 until February
of 1981 (Mann, 1984/ page 8). Mann was assigned to the night
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shift (Id.) and only occasionally worked on the day shift
(Mann, 1984, page 12). During all of the period of Michael
Mann's employment by NAC, the defendant Donald Rogers was
working on the day shift (Mann., 1984, p. 17, 58). Rogers was
not assigned to the night shift as a driver until January of
1982, almost one year after Michael Mann had been fired (Mann,
1984, p. 68; Rogers 1984, p. 21). Joseph Augestine (Augie)
Moyer went to work for NAC in September of 1979, and was fired
on January 8, 1982, before Rogers was assigned to the night
shift as a driver (Moyer, page 5).

David Jacobsen worked for

NAC from June 6, 1978 to July 17, 1980, only 2 months after
Rogers was hired (Jacobsen, page 5).
Parts of the "Statement of Facts" section of the brief
of the plaintiff-appellants are exaggerated, and one need only
go to the testimony cited as support for these exaggerated
"facts" to see that the testimony does not support the
conclusions purportedly drawn from them.
Be that as it may, Judge Fishier, in addressing NAC's
motion for Partial Summary Judgment, construed the facts in
favor of the plaintiffs, and listed in his memorandum decision
the factual inferences which, "construing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the plaintiffs", were most damaging to
NAC.

Even so, Judge Fishier, found, and correctly so, as

follows:
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The only way to prove the intent or state of
mind of an individual is to review covert
[sic] actions of that person. The trier of
fact may then, from those facts, infer what
the state of mind or intent of the
individual was at the time in question. The
inference must be a reasonable one. After a
review of all the evidence presented, this
court holds that the minds of reasonable men
could not differ, and reasonable men would
have to conclude that there was no intent on
the part of NAC to injure anyone, nor did
NAC act with an evil intent. Philip R.
Fishier, District Judge, Memorandum
Decision, Johnson v. Rogers, March 25, 1985,
p. 7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's granting of partial summary judgment
to NAC on the issue of punative damages should be upheld
because an employer should only be held liable in punitive
damages for the tortious conduct of an employee where the
employer, acting through its managerial personnel, is
independently guilty of conduct warranting punative damages.
The correct law on this point is stated in the Restatement of
Torts 2nd and is best expressed in the line of cases on point
from the state of New Mexico.

The evidence in this case does

not show that NAC was independently guilty of conduct
warranting punative damage, and did not authorize, ratify or
participate in the conduct of the defendant Rogers.
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NAC was

not reckless in hiring or retaining Rogers, did not intend to
injure anyone, and did not act with an evil intent.

Punative

damages may not be awarded in Utah without evidence of malice,
ill will or evil motive.
The trial court's denial of NAC's motion for partial
summary judgment against the plaintiff Ray C. Johnson on the
claim for damages for emotional distress should be reversed
because Utah does not recognize a cause of action for emotional
distress and Ray C. Johnson in this case would be barred from
bringing such a claim by the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act because he did not incur medical expenses in excess of five
hundred dollars.
ARGUMENT
I.

AN EMPLOYER CAN BE HELD LIABLE IN PUNITIVE
DAMAGES FOR THE TORTIOUS CONDUCT OF AN EMPLOYEE
ONLY WHERE THE EMPLOYER, ACTING THROUGH ITS
MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL, IS INDEPENDENTLY GUILTY OF
CONDUCT WARRANTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

This court has not directly addressed as a discreet

(

<

issue under what circumstances, if any, an employer can be held
liable in punitive damages for the tortious conduct of an
employee.

There are a number of points of view on the issue

among other jurisdictions.

<

The rule of pure vicarious

liability, which would allow for punitive damages in any case
i
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where the employer is liable in compensatory damages, is
clearly the minority point of view.
The rule of the Restatements, also known as the
complicity or ratification rule, has been adopted by a majority
of courts in this country.

Restatements (Second) Torts § 909

(1979) and Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 217 (1958).

This

rule imposes punitive liability only if an employer or
managerial agent authorizes or ratifies the acts of the agent,
or if the employer was reckless in employing or retaining the
agent.
The "some fault" standard adopted by Florida, and
urged in the plaintiff-appellant's brief, seems to be a
singular expression of its reasoning.
Four states apparently do not allow punitives at all.
See Brines v. HYSIOP,

337 N.W.2d 858, 864-865 (1983), and

cases cited therein.
One of the most clear expressions of the Restatement
position, and one which appears to be most suited to the
position on punitive damages generally which has been adopted
by the Utah Supreme court, is found in a line of cases from the
State of New Mexico.
The New Mexico cases derive from an opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Lake Shore & Michigan
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Southern Railway Company v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 13 S. Ct.
1261, 37 L. Ed. 97 (1893), which held:
Exemplary or punitive damages, being
awarded, not by way of compensation to the
sufferer, but by way of punishment of the
offender, and as a warning to others, can
only be awarded against one who has
participated in the offense. A principal,
therefore, though of course liable to make
compensation for injuries done by his agent,
within the scope of his employment, cannot
be held liable for exemplary or punitive
damages, merely by reason of wanton,
oppressive, or malicious intent on the part
of the agent. 147 U.S. at 107.
Mr. Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion of the
Supreme court in Lake Shore, analyzed the case law of federal
and state jurisdictions up to that time and distinguished
between compensatory damages and punitive damages as against a
principal for the acts of an agent on the basis of the
jurisprudential rationale for the awarding of the two types of
damages.

The agent, acting in the course and scope of his
i

employment, is furthering the business of the principal, acting
for the principal's benefit, and so the principal should be
economically liable for compensating those damaged by the
<

agentfs acts.

Punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages,

are designed to punish specific criminal-like conduct and to
deter other such conduct.

The agent, in acting from criminal
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or near criminal motives, is not furthering the business of the
principal/ or acting for his benefit/ and so the rationale for
respondeat superior damages does not apply.

It is necessary,

then# to find the same wrongful motives on the part of the
principal/ or to find that the principal participated in, or
ratified the acts of the agent in order to find a basis for
awarding punitive damages against the principal.

147 U.S.

106-117.
New Mexico has relied on the sound reasoning and
analysis of the U. S. Supreme Court's Lake Shore opinion in a
series of cases including Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460/ 104
P.2d 736 (1940); Sanchez v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 57
N.M. 512/ 260 P.2d 703 (1953); Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico,
89 N.M. 179/ 548 P.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1976); Samedan Oil Corp. v.
Neeld, 91 N.M. 599, 577 P.2d 1245 (1978); Cornell v.
Albuquerque Chemical Co., Inc., Ct. App. N.M.# 584 P.2d 168
(1978); Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Ct. App.
N.M., 638 P.2d 406 (1981); and Campen v. Stone, Wyoming/ 635
P.2d 1121 (1981).
A good summary of the New Mexico rule is contained in
Samedan: 577 P.2d at 1247-58:
The rule is well established in New
Mexico that the principal/ or master, is
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liable for punitive or exemplary damages
only in cases where the principal or master
has some way authorized, participated in or
ratified the acts of the agent or servant,
which acts were wanton, oppressive,
malicious, fraudulent or criminal in
nature," Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico,
89 N.M. 179, 181, 548 P.2d 459, 461 (Ct.
App. 1976). This rule is derived from a
long line of New Mexico case law, of which
Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736
(1940) is the leading decision. The meaning
of Stewart v. Potter was very clearly
expressed in a subsequent case, Sanchez v.
Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 N.M. 512,
260 P.2d 703 (1953), where it was said:
The question of the liability of a
principal for punitive damages, as
distinguished from compensatory
damages, arising out of the actions of
his agent, has already been passed upon
by this Court. Justice Mabry, in the
case of Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460,
104 P.2d 736, specifically dealt with
the two lines of authority now existing
on this question, and adopted as the
law of New Mexico the rule set out by
the United States Supreme Court in Lake
Shore & M.S. Railway Co. v. Prentice,
147 U.S. 101 [13 S. Ct. 261, 37 L.Ed.
97] * * * This rule as quoted from the
case by Justice Mabry, is as follows
[44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 740]:
"Exemplary or punitive damages,
being awarded, not by way of
compensation to the sufferer, but
by way of punishment of the
offender, and as a warning to
others, can only be awarded
against one who has participated
in the offense. A principal,
therefore, though of course liable
to make compensation for injuries
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done by his agent, within the
scope of his employment, cannot be
held liable for exemplary or
punitive damages, merely by reason
of wanton, oppressive, or
malicious intent on the part of
the agent."
Justice Mabry went on to state that,
absent participation, authorization or
ratification of the tortious act of the
agent, the principal cannot be held
liable for punitive damages. There
must be proof in the cause to implicate
the principal and make him particeps
criminis of is agent's act.
57 N.M. at 516, 260 P.2d at 706. To state
the same principle more succinctly, we have
adopted the rule that a master or principal
is not liable for punitive damages unless it
can be shown that in some way he also has
been guilty of the wrongful motives upon
which such damages are based.
It is submitted that, rather than following the
nebulous "some fault" rule of Florida, this court would well
rely for guidance upon the well grounded, well reasoned,
consistent and logical line of cases in accord with the
majority Restatement position from our neighboring state of New
Mexico, and hold that H . . . a master or principal is not
liable for punitive damages unless it can be shown that in some
way he also has been guilty of the wrongful motives upon which
such damages are based."

Samedan Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 577 P.2d

at 1248.
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Under the rule of the Restatements, the facts of the
case before the Court are insufficient to support an award for
punitive damages.

There is no evidence that NAC "authorized

the doing and the manner of the act/0 or that the agent,
Rogers, "was employed in a managerial capacity," or that NAC
"ratified or approved the act."

The only possible grounds for

recovery of punitive damages under the Restatements is if "the
agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was
reckless in employing or retaining him."
There is no evidence that NAC was reckless in hiring
or retaining Rogers.

Rogers came highly recommended by his
i

previous employer, McQuaid Towing, and had a valid Utah
chauffeur's license.

Rogers* Utah driver's license record gave

no indication of his conviction for drunken driving some years
before in Oregon (Northrup, 1983, p. 12). NAC justifiably
relied upon these facts in hiring Rogers.

NAC's actions were

not negligent in this regard, let alone reckless.
<

Likewise, the facts of the case do not indicate that
NAC was reckless in retaining Rogers in its employ during the
period of time immediately preceding the accident.

Rogers had

been an exemplary employee upon which his supervisor relied
(Northrup, 1983, pp 35-38).

Rogers was never reported for

being intoxicated or drinking on the job, nor had any other
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disciplinary actions on his employment record been taken.
(Northrup 1983/ pp. 18-19).

There is no evidence that NAC knew

that Rogers had developed a drinking problem.

There is

evidence that other NAC employees drank or smoked marijuana,
and some ex-employees now implicate Rogers in such activity.
There is no evidence that NAC supervisors had any knowledge of
such activities by Rogers, or failed to take appropriate action
against such activities by others.

The fact that NAC had

previously fired the ex-employees so testifying as to their own
transgressions indicates that NAC was acting responsibly in
trying the curb such activity, not the reverse.
What is needed for the plaintiff-appellants to prevail
on their claim for punitive damages is evidence relating to the
retention of Rogers as an employee—not evidence relating to
other employees.

There is no evidence that NAC knew that

Rogers had developed a drinking problem and was, therefore,
unfit to be employed as a driver.

Without a showing of such

knowledge, there can be no finding of "reckless retention" of
Rogers as an employee and no basis for punitive damages against
NAC under the Restatement standard.
Restatement paragraph (b), the reckless hiring or
retention of an unfit employee, is not in reality the awarding
of punitive damages against a "principal because of an act by
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an agent," but rather the awarding of damages based on the
independent act of the principal.

What the Restatement

paragraph is dealing with is the actual liability of the
principal/ because the focus is on the principal's reckless
conduct•

See Ghiardi and Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and

Practice, § 5.10/ p. 33.

The standard, therefore, must be the

same standard for awarding punitive damages in any case.

The

employer's actions must be measured by the Utah punitive
damages standard of malice, ill will or evil motive.
II.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY NOT BE AWARDED IN UTAH
WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF MALICE, ILL WILL OR EVIL
MOTIVE.

^

Plaintiffs/Appellants have urged this Court to adopt a
position that "reckless disregard for the safety of others can
be the basis for punitive damage recovery."
opening Brief/ pg. 15-16).

(Appellants*

(

Such a holding would be contrary to

established Utah law and would allow plaintiffs to use the
threat of a punitive damage award as an "jln terrorem weapon" in

f

every negligence case.
The law in Utah regarding the awarding of punitive
damages has developed over a number of years.

However, each of

I

the cases has established that the awarding of punitive damages
has required malice, ill will, or evil motive.

"Punitive

i
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damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors
of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary
negligence."
465 (1979).

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment b at
A review of the Utah Case law on punitive damages

clearly establishes that this Court has long followed the
standard.
In Murphy v. Booth, 36 Ut. 285, 103 Pac. 768 (1909),
plaintiff filed a claim against defendant alleging malicious
prosecution.

Plaintiff contended that defendant had instituted

a criminal complaint against plaintiff alleging that plaintiff
had obtained money under false pretenses.

Plaintiff further

alleged that defendant's action was "falsely, wickedly and
maliciously" contrived with the intent to injure plaintiff,
without any reasonable or probable cause.

In the trial on the

malicious prosecution claim, the trial court charged the jury
that:
If you find from the evidence that the
defendant caused plaintiff to be arrested
for the purpose of assisting defendant in
collecting a claim for moneys which
defendant thought he had against plaintiff,
or to compel the delivery of property, or to
satisfy some grudge or hatred, or to
accomplish some other ulterior or wrongful
purpose, then it was begun maliciously as
though inspired by revenge. 103 Pac. at 770
(emphasis added).
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The award of punitive damages, although reduced by the trial
court/ was affirmed on appeal*

The Utah Supreme Court adopted

the rule suggested by the appellant that:
Exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages
are such damages as are in excess of the
actual loss, and are allowed where a tort is
aggravated by evil motive, actual malice,
deliberate violence, oppression or fraud.
103 P. 770 (citing appellant's brief)
(emphasis added).
In order to sustain an award of punitive damages, therefore,
the Murphy case required the establishment of a state of mind
which evidenced evil motive, actual malice, deliberate
violence, oppression or fraud.
In Evans v. Gainsford, Utah, 247 P.2d 431 (1952), the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for assault
and battery.

The court awarded plaintiff $500.00 in special

damages, $500.00 in general damages and $1,499.95 in punitive
damages.

In addressing the issue of punitive damages, the

court affirmed:
Punitive or exemplary damages are awarded as
a punishment to defendant for malicious
conduct, and as a wholesome warning to
defendant and others not to engage in
similar indiscretions. 247 P.2d at 434
(emphasis added).
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In Holland v. Moreton, 10 Ut.2d 390, 353 P.2d 989
(I960), an action was brought by a mining claim vendor against
his agent for alleged fraud in connection with the agent's sale
of the claims.

The court said:

Where there is a wrong involving the
violation of a duty springing from a
relation of trust or confidence and the
wrong is of a gross and aggravated nature
the malicious conduct necessary to justify
punitive damages may be found (footnote
omitted). In submitting the issue of
punitive damages the court correctly
instructed the jury that they could award
such damages only if they found that
Moreton's conduct was willful and
malicious. 353 P.2d at 995 (emphasis added).
Even where there was a relationship of trust between the
parties, the Court still required a state of mind which
evidenced malice and willful conduct.
In Smoot v. Lund, 13 Ut.2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962),
an action was instituted alleging fraud and seeking a
reformation of a contract.

The court recognized, and affirmed,

that punitive damages "may be awarded only where a willful and
malicious injury has been perpetrated."

Id. at 936.

The Utah

Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claim for exemplary
damages.

-21-
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In Powers v. Taylor, 14 Ut.2d 152, 379 P.2d 380
(1963), the plaintiff brought an action for damages caused by
the defendant's horses trespassing on plaintiff's property.
The evidence showed that "even after repeated warnings and
remonstrances the defendants wrong continually persisted with
indifference to the consequences and to plaintiffs rights" and
the trial court submitted the issue to the jury as to whether
the conduct was willful and malicious.

The Court held that the

finding of willfulness and the finding of malice was supported
by the evidence.

The court sustained the awarding of $1,500.00

as punitive damages upon the finding of the deliberate, willful
conduct.
In Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Ut.2d 297, 452 P.2d
325 (1969), the plaintiff sued for damages to his house caused
by faulty workmanship in installing aluminum siding.

In

rejecting plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, the court
indicated that it must appear "not only that there was a
wrongful invasion of plaintiffs rights, but that it was done
willfully and maliciously."

452 P.2d at 328.

In Prince v. Peterson, Utah, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), the
Utah Supreme Court in reducing a $3,000.00 punitive damage
award by two-thirds, awarded for slanderous statements made by
the defendant, again acknowledged that punitive damages may be

-22-
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awarded only if "the jury finds that such injury was willful
and malicious, (footnote omitted)"

Id. at 1329.

In Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354 (1975) the
plaintiff sought punitive damages against the defendant,
alleging "willful and malicious conduct in claiming ownership
of the land and removal of cattle."

In recognizing the award

of punitive damages, but reducing the award by half, the court
addressed the purposes of punitive damages and stated that
"they are: a punishment of the defendant for a particularly
grievous injury caused by conduct which is not only wrongful,
but which is willful and malicious . . . "

Id. at 359.

Prior to 1979, then, it is clear that a jury could
only award punitive damages if it found defendant's conduct to
be willful and malicious.

A finding simply that plaintiff's

rights were violated was insufficient to support a punitive
damage award.

Only if actual malice could be demonstrated

could the award stand.
In Terrv v. Z.C.M.I., Utah, 605 P.2d 314 (1979);
modified 617 P.2d 700 (1980), a customer brought a malicious
prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment action against
a merchant.

In discussing whether the plaintiff was entitled

to a punitive damage award under the facts of that case, the
court recognized the general rule then existing in Utah:
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Generally in personal injury cases the rule
is that before the jury can award punitive
or exemplary damages the party against whom
the damages are to be awarded must have
acted willfully and maliciously. Id. at 327.
The court then went on to recognize an exception to the rule in
false imprisonment cases.

The language of the decision, by its

own terms, was to apply only to false imprisonment cases.
Relying on a North Dakota case, Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W. 2d
61, 71 (N.D. 1968) the court stated:
[I]t has long been the rule that in false
imprisonment cases punitive damages may be
awarded when a wrongful act is done
recklessly or in open disregard of one's
civil obligations and the rights of others,
[footnote omitted]
This presumed malice or malice in law does
not consist of personal hate or ill will of
one person towards another but rather refers
to that state of mind which is reckless of
law and of the legal rights of the citizen
in a person's conduct towards that citizen,
[footnote omitted] Therefore, in false
imprisonment cases the defendant need not
act with actual ill will or hatred towards
the person being confined. In such cases
malice in law will be implied from
unjustifiable conduct which causes the
injury complained of or from a wrongful act
intentionally done without cause or excuse,
[footnote omitted] (Emphasis added) 605
P.2d at 327.
The court then concluded that the jury determination
that Z.C.M.I. had failed to fall within the immunity granted by
-24-
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Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-32 because its arrest of Doris
Terry was unjustified and without probably cause, then
established the requisite "state of mind," i.e., "implied
malice" for recovery of punitive damages.

The focus of the

inquiry was on the state of mind and intent (unreasonable
detention of a customer without probable cause) of the store
employees.
The fact that Terry was specifically limited, by its
own terms, to false imprisonment cases was made clear later
that same year.

In Elkinoton v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37

(1980), an adopted daughter filed an action against her
stepfather seeking damages for sexual assault and abuse which
had occurred over a number of years.

In affirming an award of

punitive damages, the court stated:
Punitive damages may be awarded where the
nature of the wrong complained of and the
injury inflicted goes beyond merely
violating the rights of another in that it
is found to be willful and malicious. They
are allowed as a punishment to the offender
and as a warning to him and others not to
engage in similar vexatious actions,
[footnote omitted] (emphasis added) 618 at
41.
The court, besides referring to the "innate evils" of
Defendant's conduct, focused on the "willful and malicious"
conduct and to "vexatious actions," of the defendant in
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affirming the punitive damage award.

In this type of case

(i.e., non-false imprisonment case), the court did not follow
the "reckless indifference, malice in law" standard adopted in
Terry.

Rather, the Court required a finding of willful and

malicious conduct.
In First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed Yards,
Utah, 653 P.2d 591 (1982), the Court again affirmed the
"willful and malicious" standard in cases other than false
imprisonment cases.

In that case, a bank brought an action

against a feed yard and attached certain cattle kept in the
feed yard, some of which were later found to belong to an
intervenor who filed a motion to quash the writ of attachment
and claimed wrongful attachment.

Damages were awarded for the

wrongful attachment to the intervenor.

In discussing the award

of $100,000.00 in punitive damages to the intervenor, the court
stated:
Punitive damages constitute "an
extraordinary remedy . . . outside the field
of usual redressful remedies" which "should
be applied with caution lest, engendered by
passion or prejudice because of defendant's
wrongdoing, the award becomes unrealistic or
unreasonable." [footnote omitted] Such
damages may be awarded "where the nature of
the wrong complained of and the injury
inflicted goes beyond merely violating the
rights of another in that it is found to be
willful and malicious, [footnote omitted]"
(Emphasis added), id. at 598.
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Again# the court affirmed the standard for imposing punitive
damages to be a "willful and malicious1* standard/ not a
"reckless indifference" standard.
In November/ 1982/ the Utah Supreme Court issued its
decision Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., Utah/ 657 P.2d 267
(1982).

In that case, a property owner sued adjoining

landowners for pollution of plaintiff's culinary water wells
caused by percolation of oil well formation waters which
defendant had pooled on its property.

Defendant then

compounded the plaintiff's problems by continued trespass on
their land/ the spraying of waste water over their land/ and
the failure to comply with state law.

In that case, for the

first time, in a non-false imprisonment case, the Utah Supreme
Court rejected Western's claim that punitive damages were
appropriate only when willful and malicious conduct is shown
and expressed and relied on the "reckless indifference and
disregard" standard originally adopted in Terry v. Z.C.M.I.,
supra.

The Court held that Western's discharge of waste water

into the disposal pit/ intending that it seep into and
percolate through the soil/ was willful/ intentional and
carried out in disregard of the plaintiff's rights.

The

conduct was sufficient to support a finding of a state of mind
evidencing a knowing disregard of plaintiff's rights.
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In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills, Utah, 675 P.2d 1179
(1983) the Utah Supreme Court again applied the Terry standard
in a non-false imprisonment case.

In Behrens the plaintiff

brought a wrongful death action against Raleigh Hills Hospital
seeking compensatory damages.

The evidence established that on

the third day of plaintiff/decedent•s admission to the
hospital, a hospital employee allowed the decedent to use a
razor to shave.

Instead, decedent used the razor to slash his

wrists and died four days later.

In discussing the standard

for the imposition of punitive damages, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
Our cases have generally held that punitive
damages may be awarded only on proof of
"willful and malicious," conduct (citations
omitted), or on proof of conduct which
manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and disregard of the
rights of others, Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., supra; Terrv v. Zions
Cooperative Mercantile Institution, supra,
675 P.2d at 1186 (emphasis added).
It is interesting to note that the cases relied on for the
"knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of,
the rights of others" standard are Terrv v. Z.C.M.I. (strictly
limited to false imprisonment cases) and Branch (which relied
on Terrv) only.

Again, the Supreme Court did not say that mere

reckless conduct itself would support a claim of punitive
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damages.

Only if such reckless conduct evidenced "a knowing

and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights
of others" could such damages be awarded.
In 1984, the Utah Supreme Court again had occasion to
consider whether punitive damages were available in a false
imprisonment case in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., Utah,
678 P.2d 298 (1984).

After discussing the relevant case law

and the scholarly reasoning in opposition to the Terry
decision, the court stated:
In light of the apparent weight of authority
and persuasive scholarly reasoning in
support of defendant's position, we find
that a sufficient and sound basis exists for
departing from the malice in law standard
followed in Terry. Accordingly, we adopt as
the appropriate standard for determining the
availability of a punitive damage award in
an action for false imprisonment that of
"malice in fact" or "actual malice." L&. at
304.
Having expressly overturned Terry, the court impliedly
overturned those decisions which rely on the Terry "malice in
law" standard.

Appellant now argues that the McFarland holding

that punitive damages are available only upon a showing of
"malice in fact" or "actual malice" is limited to false
imprisonment cases.

However, both Terry and McFarland limited

the scope of their application to false imprisonment cases.
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Those non-false imprisonment decisions which rely on Terry for
support for "malice in law" standard were also overruled by
McFarland.
Several cases since McFarland have discussed a
"reckless indifference" standard for the imposition of punitive
damages•

The cases do not state whether a "reckless disregard"

standard is the standard for all non-false imprisonment cases,
or whether a "reckless disregard" standard may be relied on
only in an appropriate case.

The cases do not state what

degree of recklessness is required for the imposition of
punitive damages.

However, these cases clearly suggest that

focus must be placed on the state of mind of the Defendant.
Only if defendant's conduct is supportive of a state of mind
evidencing a "knowing and reckless indifference" can an award
of punitive damages stand.

In Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching

Company, Ltd., Utah, 701 P.2d 1106 (1985), for example, the
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a case involving fraud,
misrepresentation and deceit.
were not refuted.

The allegations of the complaint

The court did indicate that:

Punitive damages, among other things, punish
conduct which manifests a knowing or
reckless indifference toward, and disregard
of, the rights of others. Id. at 1106.
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. adopted
*QH r

recognizing a reckless indifference standard only if such
conduct is knowing and is supportive of malice.
In Atkin, Wright & Miles v. The Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (1985), the Utah
Supreme Court again had occasion to review an award of punitive
damages.

This Court in reversing the award of punitive

damages, stated:
Before punitive damages may be awarded, the
plaintiff must prove conduct that is willful
and malicious, Leigh Furniture and Carpet
Co. v. Isom, Utah 657 P.2d 243, 312, (1982);
First Security Bank of Utah v. T.B.J.
Feedyards, Inc., Utah, 653 P.2d 591, 598
(1982); Elkington v. Forest, Utah, 618 P.2d
37, 41 (1980); Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542,
P.2d 354, 359 (1975), or that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference and
disregard toward the rights of others.
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., Utah 657
P.2d 267, 277-78 (1982); Terry y. Zions
Cooperative Mercantile Institution, Utah 605
P.2d 314, 327 (1979). 20 Utah Adv. Rep. at
24 0
Again, the Court does not say that punitive damages are allowed
for reckless conduct.

Rather, the Court states that punitive

damages are allowed for willful and malicious conduct, or
conduct which manifests a Mknowing and reckless indifference
towards the rights of others" (i.e., state of mind as evidenced
by the conduct)•
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Mere careless, negligent or even reckless conduct,
without evil motive or design, will not support an award of
punitive damages.

Recklessness can only be a basis for

punitive damages if such recklessness is supportive of malice
or a state of mind evidencing a knowing indifference to the
rights of Appellant.

This standard is consistent with the

recent pronouncements by this Court, and is consistent with the
large body of Utah law dealing with punitive damages.
Adoption of a standard suggested by Appellant
("reckless disregard for the safety of others can be the basis
for punitive damage recovery" Appellant brief pg. 15-16) would
allow the threat of punitive damages to be used as an in
terrorem weapon in every negligence case.
The distinction between "negligence," "carelessness"
and "recklessness" are so fine that they are not subject to
precise definition.
"Negligence" has been defined as*:
The omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those ordinary
considerations, which ordinarily regulate
human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a reasonable and prudent man
would not do.
"Carelessness" has been defined as*:
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Synonymous with "negligent,M the latter
being probably the better word in
pleadings. Absence of ordinary or proper
care* Reckless. (Emphasis added).
"Reckless" is defined as*:
Not recking; careless, heedless,
inattentive; indifferent to consequences.
According to circumstances it may mean
desperately heedless, wanton or willful, or
it may mean only careless, inattentive, or
negligent.
Because the definitions of each of these words blend, overlap,
and are often used synonymously, it is difficult to determine
under what circumstances "recklessness" would be the basis for
an award of punitive damages and under what circumstances it
wouldn'tc

Appellant contends that in any negligence case

reckless conduct may form a basis for an award of punitive
damages.

If that position were adopted, in any case of simple

negligence, a plaintiff would attempt to obtain an award of
punitive damages by the semantical interplay of "careless or
negligent" conduct with "reckless" conduct.

The threat of an

* All references to Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth
Edition, citations omitted.
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award of punitive damages, in simple negligence cases then
becomes an in terrorem weapon in every negligence case.
It is respectfully submitted that conduct which
manifests "ill will, malice, intent or other evil design" only
should support a claim for punitive damages.

Mere reckless

conduct, devoid of a knowing, malicious, or intentional state
of mind, would not form the basis for such an award.
Applying this standard to the facts of this case
clearly establishes that the acts of the Newspaper Agency
Corporation do not rise to the level of imposing punitive
damages.

Judge Philip R. Fishier, in his Memorandum Decision

issued March 25, 1985 found:
The only way to prove the intent or state of
mind of an individual is to review covert
[sic] actions of that person. The trier of
fact may then, from those facts, infer what
the state of mind or intent of the
individual was at the time in question. The
inference must be a reasonable one. After a
review of all the evidence presented this
Court holds that the minds of reasonable men
could not differ and reasonable minds would
have to conclude that there was no intent on
the part of Newspaper Agency Corporation to
injure anyone, nor did Newspaper Agency
Corporation act with an evil intent.
In dismissing the claim for punitive damages, therefore, Judge
Fishier found that Newspaper Agency Corporation had not acted
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willfully and maliciously, nor had Newspaper Agency Corporation
engaged in such knowing and reckless conduct from which a
finding of malice could be inferred.

Judge Fishier8s decision

was supported by the facts established through discovery.
III. UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In Plaintiffs' second claim for relief in their
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Ray C. Johnson alleges a cause of
action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Utah Supreme Court has held on a number of
occasions that a cause of action for emotional distress may not
be based on mere negligence.

Reiser v. Lohner, Utah, 641 P.2d

93 (1982); see also Covert v. Kennecott Cooper Corporation, 23
Utah 2d 252, 461 P.2d 466 (1969); and Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961); and Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah
536, 155 P.2d 429 (1916).
In Jeppsen v. Jensen, supra., the defendant had come
into the Jeppsen home where the plaintiff was weak and ill from
a recent childbirth.

As quoted in Samms v. Eccles, supra, in a

"macabre scene" the defendant used violent and abusive language
and continually threatened the plaintiffs husband with a
revolver*

The plaintiff was so terrified that she "fell into a

swoon or faint, and was attacked by a nervous chill. . . so
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that she became prostrated and was again confined to her bed
for the greater part of two days.M
nonsuit.

The trial court granted a

Upon appeal, Justice Frisk reviewed some pertinent

authorities and quoted approvingly from Dunn v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907):
While mental suffering, unaccompanied by
injury to purse or person, affords no basis
for an action predicated upon wrongful acts,
merely negligent, yet such damages may be
recovered in those cases where the plaintiff
had suffered at the hands of the defendant a
wanton, voluntary, or intentional wrong the
natural result of which is the causation of
mental suffering and wounded feelings.
The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for a new
trial because it could not be said as a matter of law that the
defendant's conduct was not willful and wanton.
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344
(1961) a married woman sought damages for severe emotional
distress which she claimed to have suffered as a result of the
defendant's continued indecent proposals that she have illicit
sexual relations with him.

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the

status of the law of that time and held:
Our study of the authorities, and of the
arguments advanced, convinces us that
conceding such a cause of action may not be
based upon mere negligence, the best
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considered view recognizes an action for
severe emotional distress, though not
accompanied by bodily impact or physical
injury, where the defendant intentionally
engaged in some conduct toward the
plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of
inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where
any reasonable person would have known that
such would result; and his actions are of
such a nature to be considered outrageous
and intolerable in that they offend against
the generally accepted standards of decency
and morality [footnote omitted]. (Emphasis
added) Id. at 46-47.
In Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 23 Utah 2d
252, 461 P.2d 466 (1969), the Court reaffirmed the Samms v.
Eccles holding that a cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress did not exist in Utah.

In

Reiser v. Lohner, supra., Plaintiffs had asserted a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The trial court

summarily dismissed the claim on the basis that such a claim is
not recognized in the State of Utah.

In supporting the action

of the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court held:
It is well established in Utah that a cause
of action for emotional distress may not be
based upon mere negligence, (footnote
omitted) 641 P.2d at 100.
Plaintiffs' second claim for relief seeks recovery for
emotional distress.

Plaintiffs have not alleged that
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defendants intended to cause such distress.

In point of fact,

as set forth in Appellants* Opening Brief, Plaintiffs have
conceded that they could not prove actual malice in this case.
(Appellants' Opening Brief, page 15). There are no Utah cases
which recognize a "zone of danger" exception to the rule that a
claim for emotional distress cannot be based on mere
negligence.

This Court should, therefore, reverse the Order of

the Trial Court and direct the trial court to dismiss this
cause of action.
IV.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS MAY BE
MAINTAINED, PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM BRINGING
SUCH CLAIM BY THE UTAH NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT.

Since the claim of Ray C. Johnson for emotional
distress arises out of an automobile/pedestrian accident which
occurred in the State of Utah, such claim is subject to the
provisions of the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, U.C.A.
§ 31-41-1, et sea.
As part of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act,
Section 31-41-9(1) provides:
(1) No person for whom direct coverage is
provided for in this act shall be allowed to
maintain a cause of action for general
damages arising out of personal injuries
alleged to have been caused by an automobile
accident except where there has been caused
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by this accident any one or more of the
following:
(a) Death;
(b) Dismemberment or fracture;
(c) Permanent disability;
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or
(e) Medical expenses to a person in
excess of $500.00.
In seeking compensation for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress, plaintiff has alleged a separate cause of
action from that of the cause of action for the wrongful death
of his son.

As such, the cause of action for negligent

infliction of emotional distress must meet the threshold
requirements of § 31-41-9(1) in order to be maintained.

An

analysis of the statute and law indicate that it does not.
In Allstate v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980) the
Utah Supreme Court had occasion to review Section 31-41-9.
Court observed:
Under this statutory plan, first party PIP
benefits up to the amounts provided in
Section 6 are paid to an injured person
without regard to fault. Furthermore, the
injured party is precluded from maintaining
an action to recover general damages (all
damages other than those awarded for
economic loss), [footnote omitted] except
where the threshold requirements of Section
9(i) are met. 606 P.2d at 1200.
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The

Only if an injured party exceeds the threshold requirement,
therefore, can he maintain a cause of action for general
damages.
In this case, Ray C. Johnson's medical expenses for
the personal injuries sustained by him fall short of the
$500.00 threshold requirement.

As such, he is precluded from

maintaining a claim for general damages.
A claim for emotional distress is recognized as an
item of general damages.

McGregor v. Barth, Oregon, 660 P.2d

175 (1983); Garrett v. Olsen, Oregon, 691 P.2d 123 (1984).

As

quoted above, our Court has adopted this position and has held
that "all damages other than those awarded for economic loss"
are general damages.

Allstate v. Ivie, supra.

As an item of general damages, the claim for emotional
distress cannot be relied on to establish one of the enumerated
criteria to meet the threshold of § 31-41-9(1).

Only when one

has met the criteria set forth in § 31-41-9 in the form of
special damages arising out of the personal injury can any
action be maintained for general damages.

To allow plaintiffs

to assert general claims to meet the statutory threshold would
circumvent the no-fault statute.

In every case, plaintiff

could allege "pain and suffering" and seek "counseling" for
such complaint.

Plaintiffs, by bootstrapping the general
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damage claim, could circumvent the requirement of the special
damage personal injury.
In dealing with the precise issue, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court recognized that emotional distress cannot be
compensable under the Pennsylvania No-Fault Insurance Act.

In

the case of Zaqari v. Gralka, Pennsylvania, 399 A.2d 755 (1979)
the Court dealt with an alleged claim under the Pennsylvania
No-Fault Insurance Act for emotional distress.

The

Pennsylvania Act requires an injured party to meet a threshold
by showing one of several enumerated criteria which are similar
to those contained in the Utah Acto

Although Appellants

originally sought recovery for emotional distress, they
conceded on appeal that emotional distress was not compensable
under the no-fault act.
It is submitted, therefore, that Utah does not
recognize a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

Without a showing of actual malice or intentional

conduct toward the plaintiff which demonstrates an intent to
inflict emotional distress, such claim cannot stand.

Utah has

never recognized a "zone of danger" exception to the general
rule.
Assuming arguendo, that such an exception did exist,
plaintiff Ray C. Johnson did not meet the criteria established
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by Utah Code Annotated § 31-41-9(1) in order to maintain a
cause of action for general damages.

Even if he were able to

establish that he was within a "zone of danger," plaintiff
would be required to establish that he had exceeded the
limitation on tort action threshold criteria.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and each of them, it is
respectfully submitted that this Court should enter it's Order
directing the District Court to dismiss Ray C. Johnson's claim
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
upholding the District Court's Partial Summary Judgment on
A

punitive damages.
DATED this

3&

day of December, 1985.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

By.
Edward J
Attorney^ for Newspaper Agency
Corporation
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
/O

By

AL

Lowell V. Smith
Attorneys for Newspaper Agency
Corporation
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage

*4
prepaid, this 10
day of December, 1985, four true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief to the following:
Gordon L. Roberts
Julia C, Webb
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Re Paul Van Dam
Attorney for Plaintiffs
32 Exchange Place
100 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
P, Keith Nelson
Attorney for Donald Rogers
Suite 170 CSB Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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HAU nui.ES ur gypiyuUT
AND OFFICE RULES
TO ALL N / X EMPLOYES
IN ALL DEPARTMENTS
Since you spend so many of your waking hours at your
job here at NAC, it is obvious that a pleasant working
environment is highly desirable. People of good sense prefer to
live and work in an orderly way. Commonly accepted rules of
conduct help maintain better relationships between you and
your fellow workers and develop responsibility and self
improvement.
Herewith are 12 such rules, violation of any of which is
just cause for discipline or discharge. Discipline is necessary in
order to preserve good conditions for all employes. For minor
offenses, an employe will be given corrective instruction or a
verbal or written reprimand. Serious or repeated offenses will
justify more severe correction action. Suspension or discharge
will result from very serious or habitual violations.
1. Dishonesty in any form or degree.
2. Damage, loss or destruction of company, employe, or customer property
due to careless or willful acts.
3. Unauthorized removal or use of property belonging to the company, anv
other employe, or any customer.
4. Being under the influence of, or possessing or using alcohol or illegal
drugs during work time.
5 Loafing or sleeping on the job, inefficient performance of duties,
incompetence or neglect of duty; being on premises at times other than
assigned working hours.
6. Failure or willful refusal to perform work as directed, insubordination.
7. Negligence in observing fire prevention or safety regulations, or failure
to report on-the-job injuries or unsafe conditions.
8. Excessive or unexcused absence or tardiness. (This includes taking
more than the allowable 10 minutes rest periods).
9. Unwillingness or inability to work in harmony with others, discourteous,
or conduct creating disharmony, irritation or friction.
10. Fighting, gambling, horseplay or using profane, obscene or abusive
language while at work, threatening, intimidating or coercing others on
company premises or carrying unauthorized weapons.
11. Soliciting or selling on company premises except when all concerned
are relieved from duty.
12. Violation of any other commonly accepted reasonable rule of
responsible personal conduct.
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